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Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) is one of the twentieth century’s most significant 
anti-colonial intellectuals. Born in Martinique under French colonial rule, 
Fanon joined the anti-Vichy Free French Forces in World War II and served 
in North African and France. After qualifying as a psychiatrist in Lyon in 
1951, he ended up in French Algeria and practiced in Blida-Joinville 
Psychiatric Hospital until he was deported in 1957 for his political 
sympathies to the Algerian national struggle. Fanon formally joined the 
National Liberation Front (FLN) in exile in Tunis and represented the 
movement on the international stage. He also participated in editing its 
French-language publication El-Moudjahid, where his own work appeared. 
Fanon died as he was waiting for treatment for leukemia in the US, having 
just completed his political testament The Wretched of the Earth (1961), 
posthumously published, and famously prefaced, by Jean-Paul Sartre.  
 
Fanon’s writings on colonialism, racism, and anti-imperialism have had a 
massive impact around the world, especially in the global south. In addition 
to Wretched, he wrote Black Skin, White Masks (1952), A Dying Colonialism 
(1959), and Toward the African Revolution (1964). Wretched is, without 
doubt, Fanon’s most important book. Nothing like it exists in the annals of 
anti-colonial letters. No other political text expresses as astutely and 
productively the whole conjuncture of decolonization with its distinctive 
contradictions and possibilities. By targeting colonialism and positing a new 
egalitarian society in the future, Fanon captures the voice and critical 
orientation of a whole generation of radical intellectuals. 
 
To read Wretched is to enter a world of colonial division, national conflict, 
and emancipatory yearning. As a text, it combines dynamic critique with 
political passion, historical probing with denunciation of injustice, reasoned 
argument with moral indignation against suffering. This is how it inspired a 
whole generation of radicals across the world to transform societies that 
were slowly emerging from colonial domination. By identifying the racism 
and structural subordination of the colonial predicament, as well as 
charting a humanist route out, Fanon defined a politics of liberation whose 
terms and aims remain relevant today.  
 
But many of Fanon’s recent academic critics, and even some of his 
sympathizers, continued to distort and misconstrue Wretched. They inflated 
the significance of one element in the book over all others: violence. And 
they underplayed Fanon’s socialist commitment and class analysis of 
capitalism, which are two essential components in his anti-imperialist 
arsenal. Nowhere is this truer than in recent postcolonial theory. Indeed, 
postcolonial theory has come to posit violence as the theoretical core of 
Wretched. Homi Bhabha, for example, has turned Fanon’s work into a site of 
“deep psychic uncertainty of the colonial relation” that “speaks most 
effectively from the uncertain interstices of historical change”.1 In his recent 
preface to Wretched, he reads colonial violence as a manifestation of the 
 
1 Homi Bhabha, ‘Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition’, in Colonial 
Discourse and Post-Colonial, ed. by Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), pp. 112-123, p. 116, p. 113. 
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colonized’s subjective crisis of psychic identification “where rejected guilt 
begins to feel like shame”. Colonial oppression generates “psycho-affective” 
guilt at being colonized, and Bhabha’s Fanon becomes an unashamed 
creature of violence and poet of terror. He concludes that: “Fanon, the 
phantom of terror, might be only the most intimate, if intimidating, poet of 
the vicissitudes of violence”.2 This flawed interpretation eviscerates Fanon as 
a political intellectual of the first order. It also skirts far too close to tarring 
Fanon contribution’s with terrorism – a bizarre interpretation for Bhabha to 
advance in the age of America’s “war on terror”. Rather than emancipation, 
it is terror, Bhabha posits, that marks out Fanon’s life project.  
 
It is hardly surprising that in order to turn Fanon into a poet of violence 
postcolonial theorists have had to deny his socialist politics. This begins 
with Bhabha himself, whose intellectual project is premised on undermining 
class solidarity and socialism as subaltern political traditions.3 Ignoring 
Fanon’s socialist commitments is also evident in Edward Said’s reading of 
Fanon in Culture and Imperialism, which is historically sparked by the first 
intifada and Said’s critical disenchantment with Palestinian elite 
nationalism. If Said is profoundly engaged with Fanon’s politics of 
decolonization and universalist humanism, he, nonetheless, fails to even 
mention the word socialism in association with Fanon let alone read him as 
part of the long tradition of the socialist critique of imperialism. This 
dominant postcolonial disavowal of socialist Fanon is also articulated by 
Robert Young when he bluntly states that Fanon is not interested in “the 
ideas of human equality and justice embodied in socialism”.4  
 
Sartre never made that mistake, though his reading of Fanon is not without 
its flaws. In his famous preface to the book, Sartre does actually inflate the 
significance of violence in Wretched. His stark injunction is: “Read Fanon: 
you will learn how, in the period of their helplessness, their mad impulse to 
murder is the expression of the natives’ collective consciousness”. 
Decolonization, as a result, becomes indelibly associated with a “mad fury”, 
an “ever-present desire to kill”, and “blind hatred” in which the colonized 
“make men of themselves by murdering Europeans”.5 It is hard to stress 
how damaging this invocation of murder has been for understanding 
Fanon’s life work and his conception of decolonization.  
 
Sartre, however, does also emphasize Fanon’s core socialist message. Which 
he summarizes as follows: “In order to triumph, the national revolution 
 
2 Homi Bhabha, “Foreword: Framing Fanon”, in Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 
trans. by Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), pp. vii-xli, p. xxxix, p. xl.  
3 For Bhabha’s marginalization of class agency, see Nivedita Majumdar, “Silencing the 
Subaltern: Resistance and Gender in Postcolonial Theory”, Catalyst: Journal of Theory & 
Strategy, 1.1 (Spring 2017), 87-115.  
4 Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 
278. Young subscribes to Bhabha’s reading of Fanon’s colonized as responding through 
violence to the psychic drama of an identity split by power. Young calls this “the theoretical 
problem” for Fanon: ‘What is the Postcolonial”, Ariel 40.1 (January 2009), 13-24 (17). 
5 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington (London: 
Penguin Books, 2001 [1961]), p. 15-16. All subsequent page numbers are to this edition.  
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must be socialist; if its career is cut short, if the native bourgeoisie takes 
over power, the new State, in spite of formal sovereignty, remains in the 
hands of the imperialists”. And he concludes: “This is what Fanon explains 
to his brothers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America: we must achieve 
revolutionary socialism all together everywhere, or else one by one we will be 
defeated by our former masters” (10). The aim of national struggle is to forge 
a socialist internationalism premised on popular solidarity and cooperation 
– one that reconfigures sovereignty as social and economic democracy. That, 
in a nutshell, is the political cause that Fanon advances in Wretched.  
 
It has taken decades of quite willful misreading of the book to present Fanon 
as anything other than an emblem of African socialism at mid-century. For 
Fanon, socialism is the answer to the problems of racism, colonial 
domination, and economic underdevelopment that plague the Third World in 
the decolonization era. He was not a Marxist nor did he give due 
consideration to the role of the urban working class in decolonization 
struggles. But he was a materialist who anchored his analysis of colonialism 
in an objective social structure; he was, also, a class analyst of colonial 
society and anti-colonial movements; and, finally, he was committed to  a 
new universal humanism that the subordinate peoples and classes from 
across the colonial divide could participate in and help shape. For Fanon, 
ending racism and exclusion had to be done not through reifying oppressed 
identities and celebrating national or ethnic particularism, but by common 
struggle for freedom and equality. 
 
It is important to flag here that Fanon’s vision of liberation is not limited to 
national collective decolonization. To be free certainly meant living in a 
socially and politically liberated nation that independently controlled its 
economy. But Fanon took another crucial step. He advanced the notion that 
a real and authentic decolonization would have to result in the 
emancipation of the individual. Fanon articulated this idea most succinctly 
in Toward the African Revolution when he said: “The liberation of the 
individual does not follow national liberation. An authentic national 
liberation exists only to the precise degree to which the individual has 
irreversibly begun his own liberation”.6 Individual freedom is thus part and 
parcel of Fanon’s conception of anti-colonial democracy. Alongside the 
notion of “Power for the people and by the people”, in which popular 
sovereignty is a key response to tyranny and oppression, Fanon also 
advanced Enlightenment notions of human blossoming. As he specified in 
his El Moudjahid writings, these are “the essential values of modern 
humanism concerning the individual taken as a person: freedom of the 
individual, equality of rights and duties of citizens, freedom of conscience, of 
assembly, etc. all that permits the individual to blossom, advance and 
exercise his personal judgment and initiative freely”.7 Fanon thus linked 
 
6 Frantz Fanon, “Decolonization and Independence” [1958], in Toward the African 
Revolution, trans. by Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967), pp. 99-105, p. 103.  
7 Frantz Fanon, “A Democratic Revolution” [1957], in Alienation and Freedom, ed. by Jean 
Khalfa and Robert J. C. Young, trans. by Steven Corcoran (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), pp. 
567-573, p. 571.  
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democracy to a notion of self-emancipating individuals and understood 
decolonization as both collective and individual self-determination. This is, 
indeed, what Wretched ultimately yearns for: all-round democracy and 
human flourishing.  
 
This essay is organized into three core themes: Fanon’s conception of 
violence, which has attracted so much attention; his examination of the 
limits and flaws of the national bourgeoisie and its project of independence 
in the colonies; and his unique conception of liberation. I also tackle his 
distinct views on political agency and revolutionary process in the colonies. 
Wretched constitutes Fanon’s contribution to radical thought. Engaging it 
brings out Fanon’s new humanist remedies for global emancipation – a 




Wretched’s opening sentence seems to say it all: “National liberation, 
national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, 
commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas 
introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (27). But two 
things are often missed about Fanon’s justification for anti-colonial violence. 
The first is that violence is a response to the greater violence of colonialism, 
and the second is that violence is part of a broader political strategy and 
subsumed under it: necessary but insufficient without the popular 
mobilization needed to unseat colonial domination.  
 
For Fanon, colonialism was an exceptionally violent phenomenon: it 
dehumanized the colonized, divided and exploited them, deformed their 
culture, and transformed them into a lesser people. It was premised on force 
not political consensus, and resulted in the denial of people’s fundamental 
rights. As total negation, the colonized equaled “absolute evil” (32), 
immorality, laziness, poverty, depravity, ignorance, and want. Fanon argues 
that the colonized refuse to accept this colonial situation and negation. 
Colonialism fails to convince the colonized of the legitimacy of its authority 
and rule. Force breeds resistance and becomes a major source of instability 
for colonial regimes. Fanon depicts this process in the following terms: “He 
[the colonized] is overpowered but not tamed; he is treated as an inferior but 
he is not convinced of his inferiority” (41). The colonized recognize that the 
system of colonial domination and oppression is designed to keep them 
down, and that their interest lies in pushing against its constrains and 
overcoming its disabling yoke. 
 
The force of Fanon’s analysis is to argue that violence is necessary in this 
process. This is not because the colonized are inherently violent, but 
because the colonizers only understand the language of violence: 
“colonialism will only yield when confronted with greater violence” (48), and: 
“The colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence” (68). This is 
the moment of clash, confrontation, and powerful contradiction: 
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The settler’s work is to make even dreams of liberty impossible for the 
native. The native’s work is to imagine all possible methods of 
destroying the settler. On the logical plane, the Manichaeism of the 
settler produces a Manichaeism of the native. To the theory of the 
‘absolute evil of the native’ the theory of the ‘absolute evil of settler’ 
replies…. For the native, life can only spring up again out of the 
rotting corpse of the settler. (73) 
 
Statements like these have been used by postcolonial commentators to 
argue that Fanon gives dreams and mental dramas (what Bhabha describes 
as “the psycho-affective realm”) a causal primacy in explaining colonized 
conduct. But that is not how Fanon mobilizes the psychological dimension 
in his argument. Fanon utilizes phenomenological language in order to 
highlight the generative connection between the individual and wider 
historical processes. The subjective realm conveys the powerful effect that 
objective reality has on individual psychology and imagination. Indeed, the 
whole point of Fanon’s analysis is to show that it is colonialism that causes 
psychological and social injuries, distortions, and violence. Through Fanon’s 
materialist framework of explanation, ideas and feelings become symptoms 
of social structure, and have a social basis that is essential for 
understanding their emergence and development.  
 
In his chapter on “Colonial War and Mental Disorders” in Wretched, Fanon 
tackles the question of individual psychology head on, and details tens of 
actual cases from his time as a psychiatrist in Bilda-Joinville during the 
Algerian war. For example: “We have here brought together certain cases or 
groups of cases in which the event giving rise to the illness is in the first 
place the atmosphere of total war which reigns in Algeria” (217). Or: “this 
colonial war is singular even in the pathology that it gives rise to” (202). To 
argue that the root of violence lies in identarian or psychological crises is to 
miss what causes those in the first place. It thus mis-identifies the reasons 
and mechanisms of collective action. The whole point of Wretched is to 
connect social suffering to colonial relations and to identify ways to remedy 
it.  
 
Violence has a function for Fanon. It is an instrument for forging national 
unity. Only that way can the colonized hope to achieve their objectives. 
There is no violence for its own sake in Fanon. But only as a means to a 
political end: independence. The nation, thus, comes into its own as an 
oppositional political project and instrument of liberty. 
 
The Algerian context illuminates Fanon’s emphasis on prioritizing politics 
over armed struggle in Wretched. His identification with the Algerian 
Revolution’s Soummam Platform is a good example of what this actually 
meant in practice. The three-week strategy conference in 1956, held two 
years after the initiation of armed struggle by the FLN, was mainly 
associated with its architect Abane Ramadane and regarded as the most 
serious attempt to formulate a cohesive progressive vision for the 
decolonization struggle. As Martin Evans has argued: “In terms of the armed 
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struggle, Soummam established the civil structures that would govern the 
military, appointing political commissaries to organize the population, 
advising on military strategy, and putting in place people’s assemblies: a 
counter-state replacing French law and authority”. The Platform also 
articulated new rules of war for the guerillas, and “most importantly, 
Soummam produced a clear set of war aims: recognition of Algerian 
independence and the FLN as sole representative of the nation”.8 As Fanon’s 
latest biographer David Macey states, Soummam called for wider activation 
of Algerian society in the struggle for national freedom: “The need for 
alliances with the Jewish minority, women’s organizations, peasants, trade 
unions and youth groups was spelled out in some details”.9 Abane paid with 
his life for this effort. He was assassinated by the exterior leadership of the 
FLN who regarded his internalist push for political organisation as a 
challenge to their conservative allegiances to Islam, military hegemony, and 
authoritarian Arab nationalism. But his political vision lived on in Wretched.  
 
Bourgeois Independence  
 
The critical spirit of Soummam, with its emphasis on self-organization and 
popular struggle, infuses Fanon’s writings on decolonization. Especially 
important was the notion that there were competing senses of the national 
project and that decolonization is a struggle for freedom and democracy that 
takes place not only between nations but within nations as well. This 
emphasis on class analysis anchors Fanon’s political analysis in Wretched. 
Fanon’s key anxiety is that coterminous with popular national struggle is a 
national elite project of substituting external for internal forms of 
authoritarian domination and rule. His fear that the outcome of 
decolonization will not be democracy but national tyranny is palpable 
throughout Wretched. His socially dynamic conception of anti-colonial 
struggle is best expressed here:  
 
The people who at the beginning of the struggle had adopted the 
primitive Manichaeism of the – Blacks and Whites, Arabs and 
Christians – realize as they go along that it sometimes happens that 
you get Blacks who are whiter than the Whites and that the fact of 
having a national flag and the hope of an independent nation does not 
always tempt certain strata of the population to give up their interests 
and privileges…. The militant who faces the colonialist war machine 
with the bare minimum of arms realizes that while he is breaking 
down colonial oppression he is building up automatically yet another 
system of exploitation. (114-5) 
 
To “get Blacks who are whiter than the Whites” means that race solidarity 
cannot anchor the political dynamic of decolonization: “The barriers of blood 
and race-prejudice are broken down on both sides” (116).  
 
 
8 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 178-9.  
9 David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography (New York: Picador, 2000), p. 277.  
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Fanon’s rejection negritude as a political philosophy mobilization is on par 
with his emphasis on class in national struggle. Though he admired Aimé 
Césaire’s spirit of revolt and challenge against racism and colonialism, he 
found the terms of negritude’s self-affirmation insufficient, retrograde, and 
elitist. As Nigel Gibson succinctly states in his account of Fanon’s consistent 
criticisms of the cultural movement: “Negritude spoke of alienation and not 
exploitation; it spoke to the elite and not to the masses; to the literate and 
not to the illiterate”.10 This was especially true of Senghor. Negritude’s main 
African proponent wanted to revalorize the black elements that had been 
denigrated and excluded as racially subordinate by what he described as 
white civilization. Contra reason, science, and objectivity that exist on the 
white pole of the racial binary, Senghor celebrated their opposite : emotion, 
participation, and subjectivism. Fanon rejected such essentialism as it was 
premised on accepting a race-based ontological division between white and 
black that he believed was false. Though Fanon was sympathic to 
negritude’s spirit of anti-racist negation, he repudiated the racial ontological 
divide that both colonialism and negritude depended on. 
 
As early as Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon’s position on race was clear. “My 
life”, he said, “should not be devoted to drawing up the balance sheet of 
Negro values”. Adding: “There is no white world, there is no white ethic, any 
more than there is a white intelligence”.11 In an essay entitled “West Indians 
and Africa” published in 1955, Fanon is certain that negritude is the wrong 
response to colonialism: “It thus seems to me that the West Indian [Césaire], 
after the great white error, is now living in the great black mirage”.12 With 
the intensification of decolonization, negritude would come in handy. Rather 
than undermining French colonial aims in Africa, it was used to fortify it. 
Even as Senghor spoke in the name of black freedom on the African 
continent, he mobilized negritude as an ideology of state rule and rejected 
Algerian independence. Negritude’s radical race talk had actually come with 
political subservience, and this undermined the active unity and solidarity 
Fanon advocated for the African continent. Fanon’s damning judgment was 
clearly expressed in Wretched. If negritude was a symptom of the illusory 
cultural politics of race, Wretched is where Fanon would develop his 
alternative political worldview in which class politics is primary. 
 
Fanon thus charts how, during the struggle for decolonization, the colonized 
elite actively pursues its own class interests and constructs a system of 
domination and exploitation for its own benefit. Fanon calls this process 
 
10 Nigel C. Gibson, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 62. For 
more on negritude, see: Azzedine Haddour, “On Negritude and Political Participation”, 
Sartre Studies International, 1&2.11 (2005), 286-301, and Patrick Williams, “‘Faire peau 
neuve’ – Césaire, Fanon, Memmi, Sartre, and Senghor”, in Francophone Postcolonial Studies, 
ed. by Charles Forsdick and David Murphy (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 181-191. For 
recent revisionist histories, see Reiland Rabaka, The Negritude Movement (London: 
Lexington Books, 2015) and Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the 
Future of the World (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2015).  
11 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. by Charles Lam Markmann (New York: 
Grove Press, 1967), p. 229. 
12 “West Indians and Africa” [1955], in Toward the African Revolution, pp 17-27, p. 27.  
 8 
“The Pitfalls of National Consciousness” and dedicates a whole chapter in 
Wretched to elaborating the bourgeois approach to national independence. 
Writing as decolonization was taking place, Fanon articulates a deep anxiety 
about the nature and quality of freedom being advocated by national elites. 
His whole emphasis is about a collective unity cracking up and fracturing 
because of the colonial bourgeoisie: “The national front which has forced 
colonialism to withdraw cracks up, and wastes the victory it gained” (128). 
Elite interests trump the politics of equality and social solidarity. In a deep 
sense, the global south is still suffering from the effects of the bourgeoisie’s 
foundational social treason: “The treason is not national, it is social” (116).   
 
In order to sustain its own class domination and accumulation strategies, 
the colonial bourgeoisie institutes a one-party system, turns its back on its 
own people, and looks for compromise and support from its old colonial 
masters. This is not surprising, and is consistent with research that has 
been conducted about this period. For example, Vivek Chibber, who has 
debunked the myth of a developmental national bourgeoisie in the colonies, 
described the postcolonial political economic order as a form of 
developmentalism that “in essence, amounted to a massive transfer of 
national resources to local capitalists” (157). Aijaz Ahmad has also argued 
that decolonization ended up giving power “not to revolutionary vanguards 
but to the national bourgeoisie poised for reintegration into subordinate 
positions within the imperialist structure”.13 
 
Fanon was cognizant of this potential eventuality and critiqued it as it was 
happening. He saw that elite nationalization was being undertaken not “to 
satisfy the needs of the nation” but for private profit: “To them 
nationalization quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those 
unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period” (122). 
Decolonization is here read as class substitution: a local bourgeoisie simply 
takes over the levers of economic and political power from its old colonial 
masters and sits in its place. In neocolonial logic, it “discovers its historic 
mission: that of intermediary”: “of being a transmission line between the 
nation and a capitalism, rampant”. Indeed: “The national bourgeoisie will be 
quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent” 
(122).  
 
It needs to be admitted that this acute analysis of the colonial ruling classes 
stands in contrast with Fanon’s acceptance of the mythology around the 
bourgeoise in Europe.  . At the same time as he debunks the myth of the 
national bourgeoisie as agent of freedom in the colonies, Fanon fortifies 
another: that the bourgeoisie had fought for liberal freedoms in its 
homeland, but is  betraying that noble mission in the colonies. By utilizing 
the historic analogy of the bourgeois revolution in Europe, Fanon argues 
that the national bourgeoisie in the colonies is failing in its historic task of 
pushing thorough an authentic democratic revolution, and hence, shirking 
from the progressive role its forebearers played in Europe.   As he states: 
 
13 Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1994), p. 28.  
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“the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies itself with the 
decadence of the bourgeoisie of the West”. It emulates that class’s “senile” 
end rather than its “first stages of exploration and invention”, and “lives to 
itself and cuts itself off from the people” (123). The result is that the colonial 
bourgeoisie constitutes an impediment to progress and liberation.  
 
But what Fanon does not realize is that the bourgeoisie is actually behaving 
in character and that the bourgeois revolution is a myth. As Vivek Chibber 
argues, misreading the history of the bourgeoisie and attributing to it a role 
of political heroism is a common mistake made by postcolonial theorists . 
Democracy and liberalism do happen in the capitalist era, but they do so 
not as a result of the “bourgeoisie as historic actor”. As Chibber observes, , 
capital never intended to transpose a liberal order in the colonies, since it 
never implanted one in Europe.. What it “universalizes” is no freedom and 
liberty, but a regime of market dependence; what it seeks is not liberal 
equality, but its own political dominance. Any democratic achievements of 
the so-called bourgeois revolution result from popular mobilization and 
pressure from below, both in the metropolitan heartland and in the colonies. 
Hence, even in the heady days of the French Revolution, : “The revolution 
had finally become antifeudal and democratic, but not because of a 
‘bourgeois project’. The ‘bourgeois’ legislators of the Third Estate had to be 
dragged kicking and screaming to assume their role as revolutionaries”.14  
 
There is, thus, no ideal of a liberal bourgeoisie against which the colonial 
capitalists might be measured and found wanting. The bourgeoisie behaves 
in a similar way across the colonial divide: narrowly self-interested, afraid of 
democracy and popular sovereignty, and authoritarian. “The fact is,” 
Chibber concludes, “the European bourgeoisie was no more enamored of 
democracy, or contemptuous of the ancient régime, or respectful of 
subaltern agency, than were the Indians”. What Fanon reads as its social 
treason in the colonies was, then, its core universal feature. His analysis 
and description of its conduct there reflects its class behavior everywhere.  
 
If Fanon’s historical class analogy was flawed, his real intervention lies 
elsewhere: in the political lessons he draws. In what needs to happen in the 
colonies in order for the revolutionary struggle to overcome the local 
bourgeoisie’s elitist vision of independence. His clear answer was democratic 




Faced with these problems of decolonization – a self-interested bourgeoisie 
and severe underdevelopment – Fanon offers an oppositional socialist vision 
of emancipation. Neither by emulating Soviet bureaucratic politics nor 
Western capitalist democracy, he advances a New Left alternative instead:  
 
 
14 Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital (London: Verso, 2013), p. 
52, p. 75. Next quote is from p. 101.   
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Capitalist exploitation and cartels and monopolies are the enemies of 
under-developed countries. On the other hand the choice of a socialist 
regime, a regime which is completely oriented towards the people as a 
whole and based on the principle that man is the most precious of all 
possessions will allow us to go forward more quickly and more 
harmoniously, and thus make impossible that caricature of society 
where all economic and political power is held in the hands of a few 
who regard the nation as a whole with scorn and contempt. (78) 
 
Fanon returns to this clear position so often in Wretched that it is surprising 
that so many postcolonial commentators ignore it. They prefer to quote the 
following by Fanon and to pretend that the humanism he invokes is 
somehow distinct from socialism: “But if nationalism is not made explicit, if 
it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a 
consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into humanism, 
it leads up a blind alley” (165). Said does this in Culture and Imperialism. If 
he goes to Fanon to justify his emerging critique of Palestinian bourgeois 
nationalism during the first intifada, he remains silent about Fanon’s New 
Left socialism. But socialism is the one word that captures Fanon’s 
worldview and explains the basis of his critique of bourgeois nationalism 
that Said was after. 
 
For Fanon, national consciousness has to become an instrument for 
satisfying the needs of the majority. He thus emphasizes the colonized’s 
mass capacity for self-government – “to govern by the people and for the 
people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts” (165) – and argues that 
everything “depends on them” (159). The whole emphasis is not only on 
democracy as outcome but democracy as form and process of organization: 
a true popular sovereignty. He articulates a clear rejection “to cultivate the 
exceptional or to seek for a hero, who is another form of leader” (158). 
Decentralized organization is a mode “to uplift the people” (159) and 
humanize them after the negations of colonialism. It is they who are “the 
demiurge” (159) of their destiny: collective responsibility is key. This 
egalitarian vision also extends to gender equality. Fanon’s anti-patriarchal 
sentiments are clear: “Women will have exactly the same place as men, not 
in the clauses of the constitution but in the life of every day: in the factory, 
at school, and in the parliament” (163). This widespread social participation 
is part and parcel of the revolution’s deepening “social and political 
consciousness” (163).  
 
It is on the basis of such democratic self-organization that Fanon can argue 
for equality and cooperation between nations. Contra exclusionary 
nationalisms and competition, his internationalist commitments are evident 
when he states that: “It is at the heart of national consciousness that 
international consciousness lives and grows. And this two-fold emerging is 
ultimately the source of all culture” (199). As Sartre understood all too well, 
either the Third World rises together in unity and solidarity or it falls apart 
in division and fragmentation. Only as a unified cooperating self-governing 
bloc can it face off the might of Western imperialism.  
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Wretched is thus committedly internationalist and refuses to essentialize the 
West as irredeemably racist or incapable of anti-systemic mobilization. It is 
clear as early as the conclusion of his first chapter “Concerning Violence” –
so, quite unmissable – that Fanon is a universalist. Indeed, he actively 
invites the contribution and participation of subordinate European classes 
in the struggle to “rehabilitate mankind, and make man victorious 
everywhere” – seeing in them allies and potential agents for change:  
 
This huge task which consists of reintroducing mankind into the 
world, the whole of mankind, will be carried out with the 
indispensable help of the European peoples, who themselves must 
realize that in the past they have often joined the ranks of our 
common masters where colonial questions were concerned. To achieve 
this, the European peoples must first decide to wake up and shake 
themselves, use their brains, and stop playing the stupid game of 
Sleeping Beauty (84). 
 
What is striking about this openness is not only its inclusive vision but its 
distinct substantive claims. While many European critical theorists (like 
Adorno and Horkheimer) had at the time discounted the possibility of 
popular mobilizations for socialism in the West, Fanon does not.15 Rather 
than seeing permanent subaltern integration into capitalist structures and 
political neutralization, Fanon saw exclusionary ideologies that needed to be 
fought and a political potential for action. At a time when European Marxist 
theory had become “an esoteric discipline whose highly technical idiom 
measured its distance from politics”, Fanon offered theory as intellectual 
activity centered on politics, subaltern agency, and radical transformation. 
Only with the explosion of working-class mobilizations in 1968 were the 
exponents of defeat forced to grapple with their views on the degradation of 
political agency.  
 
Contra Western Marxism, Fanon’s openness to working-class agency in 
Europe was there all along and clear in Wretched. In his concluding chapter, 
he employs an impassioned rhetoric that expresses his deep disappointment 
in Europe’s imperial history and ongoing commitment to global domination. 
But he is far from being anti-European, nor does he tar Europe as 
permanently disabled by its old colonial practices. Fanon’s injunction is to: 
“Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder 
men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own 
streets, in all the corners of the globe” (251). The Europe he wants to bury 
forever – never again to be imitated or mimicked – is the Europe of violence, 
arrogance, hypocrisy, and the crushing of humanism. It is exploitative 
capitalist Europe that broke the individual and tore her away from 
autonomous unity.  
 
 
15 For the impact of defeat on Western Marxism, see Perry Anderson, Considerations on 
Western Marxism (London: Verso, 1976), p. 42. The following quote is from p. 53.  
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If European workers suffering under its oppressive yoke had once shared in 
“the prodigious adventure of the European spirit” (253), it is now time to 
break with its assumptions and join in forging a new universal humanism in 
common with other subordinate classes. By challenging global imperialism 
and capitalism, a radical Third World is calling for genuine connections, 
diversity, and a worldwide process of re-humanization. Fanon’s proposition 
is not a simple reversal of Eurocentrism, celebrating the cultural 
nationalism or particularism found in race ideologies like negritude that he 
so devastatingly critiques as regressive in Wretched. Nor does he deny 
Enlightenment’s contribution to human emancipation. Quite the opposite 
actually: “All the elements of a solution to the great problems of humanity 
have, at different times, existed in European thought” (253). The real novelty 
of Fanon’s position lies in its emphasis on political practice. What Wretched 
anticipates is a new politics of humanity that, sparked by the new frontiers 
of resistance in the global south in places like Algeria and Vietnam, 




Fanon’s elaborations on agency are, nonetheless, not free from theoretical 
and political complications. Especially about the social basis of revolt and 
about who will lead revolutionary practice in the colonies. It is worth 
examining these issues here as they raise certain problems about his 
conception of socialism.  
 
Fanon saw himself as both conveying the “human realities” (40) of the 
settler colonial divide visible through markers of race, violence, and force as 
well as adapting Marxist theory to the historical specificity of colonial 
relations. In order to capture the nature of the colonial divide, he does state 
– but then transcends – the following: “In the colonies the economic 
substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you 
are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is 
why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have 
to do with the colonial problem” (40). Does Fanon mean that all colonial 
whites are rich and all colonized are poor? His whole analysis in Wretched 
shows the limits of this logic and how it needs to be overcome in order for 
socialist decolonization to take place. Race alone obscures political 
assessment in the colonies. As Fanon states: “The settler is not simply the 
man that must be killed. Many members of the mass of colonialists reveal 
themselves to be much, much nearer to the national struggle than certain 
sons of the nation” (116). This truth becomes apparent through the process 
of revolutionary struggle that challenges the unequal distributions of human 
well-being, living standards, and space in settler colonial cities. In the 
process, race becomes something to be transcended not reified.  
 
Stretching Marxist analysis to the colony is done by accounting for the 
mechanisms of colonial structure: through a class analysis conducted 
during a historical process of national revolution. Fanon dedicates the 
second chapter of Wretched, “Spontaneity: Its Strengths and Weakness”, to 
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identifying and weighting the different social forces involved. It is here that 
he finds most reason to distance himself from what a Marxist analysis of 
capitalism in a more economically advanced European metropolis entails. 
Like many socialist revolutionaries in the Third World, his challenge was to 
convey the distinct workings of capitalism in the colonies and to propose a 
historically specific strategy to transform it.  
 
Fanon’s theory of revolutionary process is based on some key historical 
facts. First, both the Communist parties in France and Algeria had rejected 
political independence for Algeria for the longest time, under different 
pretexts ranging from fighting traditionalism in Arab society to advocating 
gradualist political reforms in the colony. This tarred communism with 
political ambivalence at best or colonial contempt at worst. Second, the 
majority class in Algeria at the time (and in the Third World at large) was the 
peasantry. For a political movement built around proletarian revolution and 
the proletariat as leading “grave diggers” of capitalism (as Marx and Engels 
put it in the Communist Manifesto), this presented understandable 
challenges. As the Russian Revolution had shown earlier in the twentieth 
century, the question of devising socialist outcomes in economically under-
developed societies, where the core agent of socialism is a minority class, is 
a real political challenge. This applied to the colonies. Who could carry 
colonial society beyond capitalism? This was, arguably, one of Marxism’s 
core preoccupations in the twentieth century, especially since all successful 
socialist revolutions took place outside of advanced capitalist countries: in 
Russia not Germany and in Cuba not America. Fanon’s “stretching” of 
Marxist analysis speaks to this conundrum.  
 
Faced with colonial Algeria’s social structure, Fanon advances the following 
conclusions. Since both the urban bourgeoisie and the working-class are 
integrated into colonialism, he surmises, the radical leadership of the 
revolution should look to the countryside for alternatives. There the 
peasantry constitutes a spontaneously anti-colonial mass adversely affected 
by colonial dispossession. Unable to surpass its elementary and diffuse 
forms of revolt, peasant resistance is in bad need of the discipline and 
national organization that only a radical leadership could bring. Through a 
process of mutual education between leaders and masses, the basis for a 
revolutionary war is laid. The role of the lumpenproletariat is ambiguous and 
contradictory but, nevertheless, significant for bringing the revolution back 
from the countryside to the city. As he charts the trajectory of revolutionary 
process, what Fanon emphasizes is how the revolution unifies villages, 
towns, and cities by forging national solidarity: “These politics are national, 
revolutionary and social and these new facts which the native will now come 
to know exist only in action” (117). He concludes his chapter on 
“Spontaneity” with this damning description of the bourgeois independence 
movement that revolutionary praxis has to overcome: “Without that struggle, 
without that knowledge of the practice of action, there’s nothing but a fancy-
dress parade and the blare of trumpets. There’s nothing save a minimum of 
readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there at the 
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bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly marking 
time” (118).  
 
While Fanon’s critique of bourgeois nationalism and his social emancipatory 
vision are exemplary, his trajectory of actual practice can be faulted for 
being dismissive of working-class agency. Indeed, Wretched develops a 
thesis about the colonial urban proletariat that mirrors Lenin’s aristocracy 
of labour thesis. If, for Lenin, imperial profits were used to divide the 
working class at home and create an aristocracy of labour stratum loyal to 
the ruling elite, colonialism for Fanon does something similar in relation to 
colonized labour. Fanon’s language even echoes Lenin’s analysis, without 
mentioning him by name. As when Fanon states: “The embryonic proletariat 
of the towns is in a comparatively privileged position …. In the colonial 
countries the working class has everything to lose; in reality it represents 
that fraction of the colonized nation which is necessary and irreplaceable if 
the colonial machine is to run smoothly: it includes tram conductors, taxi-
drivers, miners, dockers, interpreters, nurses and so one” (86). Fanon dubs 
this urban proletariat “the ‘bourgeois’ fraction of the colonized people” (86).  
 
Leaving aside whether Lenin’s thesis on metropolitan workers is correct or 
not, Fanon’s dismissal of the colonial working class is far more categorical. 
A whole urban proletariat is not only politically discounted but viewed as a 
pampered colonial product lacking political agency and purely motivated by 
narrow economistic self-interest. Was this empirically correct? There are 
many examples that suggest otherwise.16  
 
This was especially true for Algeria where the urban proletariat originated in 
mass impoverished landless rural labour and was a direct product of French 
colonial land expropriation and proletarianization. If its role during the 
decolonization struggle of the 1950s seemed small to Fanon, this is a 
reflection of French colonial repression in the cities as well as urban 
workers’ lack of real leverage in a French colonial society mainly reliant on 
its own settler labour. As the colonial economy severely restricted Algerian 
labour and its material well-being, Algerian workers left to mainland France 
in the hundreds of thousands. As Mahfoud Bennoune argues in his history 
of Algeria, labour migration to France resulted from economic exclusion: 
“The colonial economy was incapable of satisfying the basic needs of the 
Algerian population”. This migration had direct economic and political 
results that included political radicalisation in the metropolis where more 
political freedoms where possible. Ending colonialism and Algerian 
independence became key objectives of the “first Algerian working-class 
nationalist movement”, the North African Star (ENA) party which was 
founded in Paris in 1926 and then “transplanted” to Algeria. “The 
 
16 For an easily accessible literary example, see Sembene Ousmane’s novel God’s Bits of 
Wood (1960). It is a superb dramatization of the famous 1947-8 anti-colonial workers strike 
on the Dakar-Niger railway that crippled French colonialism, and conveys the political 
agency and potential of the industrial proletariat. For an empirical examination of the 
validity of Fanon’s claim, see Richard Sandbrook, Proletarians and African Capitalism: The 
Kenya Case, 1960–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).  
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experiences of these uprooted workers gave rise to the most radical national 
movement of colonial Algeria”.17 Contra Fanon, therefore, the urban 
working-class links with, and contributions to, national struggle were 
evident.  
 
Fanon misses another crucial point about working-class agency. There is a 
direct link between a small and weak urban working-class and the problems 
of achieving socialism in decolonizing societies. Stretching Marxism cannot 
sidestep key political realities. If Fanon understands the problems of petty 
bourgeois nationalism well, he fails to see how the structural weakness of 
the proletariat impacts on democratising forces in decolonization, and how 
this increases the obstacles to socialism. Without workers’ democratic 
control and leverage over decolonizing leaderships, bureaucratic and petty 
bourgeois forms of rule get empowered. As Michael Löwy put it, petty 
bourgeois substitution and containment of revolutionary aspirations lead to 
bourgeois restoration: they are “a transitional stage towards neo-bourgeois 
stabilization and the renewal of dependence upon imperialism”.18  
 
Marnia Lazreg advances this political eventuality in relation to Algeria. She 
argues that, both during and after the struggle for independence, the FLN 
petty bourgeois bureaucracy undermined alternative forms of popular power 
for workers and peasants. It also co-opted socialism and turned it into a 
state ideology of authoritarian rule – thus paving the way for the restoration 
of bourgeois power: “Hence the policy of encouraging and protecting Algerian 
private capital”.19 Left forces within the FLN and outside of it (like the 
labourist Party of the Socialist Revolution) did marshal a strong critique of 
the FLN’s compromised political and economic policies, and they did call for 
worker and peasant mobilizations in order to institutionalize Algerian 
socialism and roll back the power of bourgeois fractions. But they were 
suppressed and disorganized.20 This, in turn, empowered counter-
revolutionary forces even further – making the bourgeois restoration of 
capitalism in post-independence Algeria a near certainty. Wretched warns 





17 Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1930-1987 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 76, pp. 78-82. The Algerian Popular Party and the 
Movement for the of Democratic Liberties also contributed to the development of the 
national movement.  
18 Michael Löwy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development (London: Verso, 1981), 
p. 207.  
19 Marnia Lazreg, The Emergence of Class in Algeria: A Study of Colonialism and Socio-
political Change (New York: Routledge, 2018; org. Westview Press, 1976), p. 136. See 
Chapter 5 for the Algerian state’s containment of post-independence workers’ self-managed 
enterprises, its weakening of organized producers and boosting of capitalism.   
20 For post-colonial class struggle, see Mahfoud Bennoune, Merip Reports, 48 (June 1976), 
3-24, especially 6-11. See also Ian Clegg’s important study Workers' Self-Management in 
Algeria (New York: Monthly review Press, 1971). 
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Sixty years after its publication, what is the value of Wretched today? 
Wretched in no bible and the Left is not a church steeped in dogma. The 
book’s political significance, nonetheless, is unequivocal. Wretched has a 
particular value for radicals and socialists motivated to challenge racial 
oppression and social injustice today. This lies not only in its class analysis 
of decolonization and its socialist vision of emancipation. But also in the 
enduring connections it makes between popular sovereignty, anti-
capitalism, and anti-imperialism. Reading Wretched today is recognising 
that socialism was a historically possible route out of colonial capitalism 
that was missed. That the way to tackle racism and global inequality is by 
digging deep into the material infrastructure that generates them. That 
structures of power are transformed by agents who have both the capacity 
and the interests to challenge them. And, finally, that the core activity of 
universalists is to identify what is common between separate identities 
rather than to inflate what is different. Here cross-national solidarities are 
crucial for undermining forms of rule based on elite nationalism and elite 
cooperation in global capitalism.  
 
In addition, Wretched strikes the right balance between culture and politics. 
Rather than inflating the significance of cultural identities “around songs, 
poems or folklore”, Fanon insisted that political struggle is an essential 
substance of culture: “No one can truly wish for the spread of African 
culture if he does not give practical support to the creation of the conditions 
necessary to the existence of that culture; in other words, to the liberation of 
the whole continent” (189). Fanon’s materialism shines through here as 
well: material conditions and social relations have primacy over the cultural 
practices of past generations. Culture requires freedom, and freedom 
requires politics. There is no way for culture to shortcut the political 
struggle for liberation. That explains Fanon’s orientation towards 
establishing a new humanist society in the future. What counts is a radical 
politics of culture – not cultural politics.  
 
Replicating Fanon in our own contemporary moment means devising a 
materialist analysis of the global south rooted in categories like class and 
capital, and being acutely aware of the challenges of radical political agency 
in the era of neoliberal capitalism. In a world of rising global inequality, 
ideologies of cultural difference are constantly utilized by the Right to justify 
competition and rivalry. In the name of global security and self-defence, 
universal rights and international norms of justice are gutted by powerful 
states. In such an unequal world, Fanon, no doubt, cuts an oppositional 
figure that inspires a new generation searching for socialist precursors and 
radical political models. Fanon’s faith in reason, resistance, and 
revolutionary consciousness reverberates across the decades. Fanon’s 
radical opposition to the existing political and social order of his own time is 
certainly worth studying and advancing today.  
